Mrs. Doshi, Mr. Arun Bongirwar, Mr. Bharat Doshi, Mr. Jayant Kawale, ladies and gentlemen.

I am extremely grateful to the Lalit Doshi Memorial Trust for having invited me to deliver the 2002 Lalit Doshi Memorial Lecture. I have been asked to speak on Terrorism and India, a subject on which, in the last one decade a lot has been written and spoken about. But, when the debate goes on and on, one of the impressions which is formed by an average reader or an ordinary citizen, is one of great frustration. Why is it that we are not able to contain this menace? At times some of us even do not aptly realize what the major dimensions and consequences of this issue have been. I recollect on 9/11 when the World Trade Center in New York was attacked and the Pentagon was partly damaged, more than 3000 lives were lost. In his first address to the World, the President of the United States started off by saying that "a War has been launched on us". It was one major incident, highly deplorable, killing about 3,000 people, probably one of the most severe terrorist attacks in the World anywhere, and the US President rightly commented so. We, in India, have had conventional wars. We had a conventional war in 1947. We had with Pakistan a conventional war in 1965 and in 1971. We had a conventional war with China in 1962, one recently in Kargil. I think the consequences or the effect, the final drubbing, that our neighbour received in the other three wars, perhaps brought about a change in thinking. Our conventional strength far out-matches them and therefore in the last 15 odd years a
different form of proxy war has started. It would also be erroneous for us to restrict this proxy war only in the context of Jammu & Kashmir. We have in the last 15 odd years, seen 5 different kinds of terrorism emerging in India. Of course the most significant one, is the one we see on account of cross border insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir. The second, in the Punjab, which we saw through the 1980s and early 1990s, which we were fortunate to have been able to over-come. The third we saw a severe problem, since then partly diluted, in the South from the LTTE. We have had continued insurgency in several parts of North East and the latest to join these categories has been the kind of terrorism which has spread along various parts of central India, the Maoist insurgency from Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, parts of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar right up till the Nepal border. No less severe, the kind of terrorism which we see inspired by various other external agencies.

A number of people have still not realized the consequences, the price and the cost that we have had to pay for this. I remember early this year when there was a debate on a proposed Anti-Terrorist law. I tried to collect several figures, I have updated those figures as to what is the cost involved as far as India is concerned. And compare it to the cost United States had to pay when their President said "a War has been launched on us". In the four conventional wars that we have fought, I am also including Kargil in it, the total number of people who lost their lives, i.e. the security people, is 9857. So, little less than 10,000 people lost their lives, in all the conventional wars that India has fought till date. In the last 15 years, the number of civilians who have lost their lives to terrorism is 62,221. A figure almost 6 to 7 times more than those who have lost their lives in conventional wars. The security personnel killed in various terrorist actions is again over 9,000. You can add this to the 62,000 figure and you can find that conventional wars,
which now don’t seem to be a recurring occurrence, is very insignificant in comparison to this proxy war which has continued. Number of people rendered homeless is close to 6 lakhs. The total amount of money spent and this doesn’t include the amount that we spent on our security forces, army and so on, on merely relief and rehabilitation, on the special paramilitary forces that we deploy for anti-insurgency - the figure now crosses Rs.45,000 crores. More than Rs.45,000 crores, what is deprived to our villages in terms of electricity and power, in terms of health care, in terms of education, in terms of roads. That is the kind of money which has actually been employed in just the anti-insurgency measures. Merely the increase in budget on agencies involved in fighting terrorism, since the early 80s, is 2600%. That is the cost involved as far as terrorism is concerned. What is the kind of methodologies the terrorists employ? I will just read out one figure, I have several others, sharing the kind of seizures which our security agencies have made. What has been already deployed in killing these 62,000 and 9,000 people is something separate. Just the seizures alone of explosives and I am not referring to the details of rifles, pistols, grenades, machine guns, in the seizure and you can exclude the ones (explosive) which are utilised in this, is more than 49,000 kgs. Close to 50,000 kgs and I asked one of the security experts, as to how much is this figure of 49,000 kilograms plus, what is the damage potential that it has, and I was told that the damage potential that this has had is actually to strike out and blast every inch of Indian soil. That is the kind of insurgent effort as far as India is concerned. And if we geographically test it out, there is hardly any region of the country which remains unaffected by this. These are just numerical figures, but these numerical figures in relation to the terrorism, in terms of money spent, the national effort wasted is only one aspect of the picture.
There is another great aspect -- as to what are the other hidden costs, which are involved as far as terrorism is concerned. Firstly, there is a large political cost. The political cost involved is that terrorism tends to undermine democratic values. It undermines democratic institutions. It assaults each one of them and then a feeling gains ground that in order to deal with terrorists, you need certain strong methods to deal with them and therefore you have to depart from what is the chosen democratic cause itself. It has an adverse effect as far as economic growth and development is concerned. How much did one of India’s most affluent States, the Punjab, suffer on account of terrorism in 10 years?

It then leads to the strong anti-terrorist methods which are employed as part of counter terrorism, the end result is what is normally a phrase used in the areas affected by terrorism, a sense of alienation. Because a sense of alienation builds in when strong counter terrorism methods are used; because innocent citizens at times may also become victims of counter terrorist methods. We hear this phrase repeatedly in the context of Kashmir. Why don’t you take steps in order to prevent alienation of population. The security forces don’t go there to alienate the people there, they go there in fact to protect the people from the terrorists. When the security forces act, the kind of propaganda which builds up, results in alienation of people. I was recently going through some very interesting figures when we discussed this alienation. For different years, I tried to pick up and this is the non-security expenditure from the planned and the non-planned expenditure by Government of India, which is an assistance given to various states. What is the per capita expenditure that we undertake on every citizen of India in each state. What is the all India average when it comes to the rest of the country and what is the comparative amount that we spend on citizens living in Jammu & Kashmir. And I found that in the last 10 years, when I ran through the figures, each year the difference was ranging between
1 to 7 or 1 to 10. So in terms of expenditure you are spending on an average citizen of Jammu & Kashmir 7 to 10 times more in terms of central assistance than you are spending on an average citizen of rest of the country. And despite that a sense of alienation can get built-in, because when terrorists strike them, people don’t like investing, where *Jehadis* are moving with guns, even traditional income avenues suffer; sense of security suffers and counter terrorism measures at times end up in alienating people. And then this defies the real logic. I looked at the second figure, in 1999-2000 the national figure of population living below poverty line is 26%. In the last three years it may have come down a little bit but that is the last figure which is available. An affluent State like Punjab compared to this national figure of 26% living below poverty line (BPL), was close to 6.5 per cent. On the strength of this entire central assistance which is given, I was curious to know what was the BPL figure, the below poverty line figure in Jammu & Kashmir. It is lesser than Punjab - at 3.8%! So, you can have 7 to 10 times more grant, you can have a BPL figure of 3.8% and still a message can go nationally and internationally that there is a growing sense of alienation, because of the entire environment created by the terrorists.

They have undermined democratic values. They have had an adverse impact on the growth rates in the State, they lead to an increased sense of alienation. They assault social cohesion of the society. You have had migration of population. You had dissatisfaction between different groups of population. One community, the Pandits, had to move out completely. The valley has discontentment for its own reason. If you go to the Ladakh and the Jammu region, there is discontentment that we don’t get our share of the entire assistance and development and the root cause of this discontentment that builds up, is the kind of impact that terrorism leaves on a civil society. There is also on other areas a serious adverse effect, that it can have on the defense preparedness of the country.
Because, if a large part of the national resource is to go into various other anti-insurgency measures and the costs involved therein, then you tend to neglect areas where you should conventionally have been spending. These are several areas with which different agencies and instruments of the government have been fully seized of. In fact now the realization that the state is having repeatedly, that the conventional wars are not the real threat. It is the on-going proxy war by way of terrorism, which can have a far more dangerous impact on a society and far more difficult to fight with.

I will just quote one or two paragraphs for instance from the deliberations of the group of ministers on national security. This is May 2001 - "while instances of inter-State wars have significantly declined and are expected to continue to do so, there is an increase in cross border interference by one State in the internal environment of another, arising out of territorial, religious, cultural, ethnic factors and the easy availability of sophisticated weaponry in the international market. This trend is likely to continue at least in short and medium terms". The National Security Advisory Board observes - "In the foreseeable future, international terrorism and induced domestic terrorism will pose a greater danger to our national security than a conventional war. National response to terrorism in its varied form is presently inadequate, of an ad-hoc character and generally ineffective". The Kargil review committee almost said the same thing. "Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and the North East. In the present international security environment proxy war and terrorism have become preferred means of hurting a neighbour's social, political and economical well-being".

Now this is the real challenge, and for this real challenge we have various forces, substantially outside the country some of them even aided by small groups within the
country and I for one believe we should never be misled by the kind of ostensible stand that people take when put under various international pressures so that they get to escape out of a given situation -- convenient stands of the kind which our neighbour has taken.

May I just highlight this by quoting what the real intention, and here I am just going to quote 5-7 people as to what their real intention as far as employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy by our neighbour is concerned or by various groups, which at least our neighbour now wants us to believe and wants the world to believe, are functioning without its patronage or authority. General Pervez Musharraf, I am reading one of his year 2000 statements -- "Jehad is not Terrorism". This is the philosophy he tried to espouse. Mujahideen organizations are not terrorist organizations. Jehad has been revived during the Afghan war and now it is Jehad in Kashmir, Muslims from different parts of the world were coming to support their oppressed brothers and sisters". It is a different matter that after 9/11 he decided to have a different policy, having publicly taken a stance that what was happening in Afghanistan was actually Jehad. He decided to create a distinction between what he wanted to do on his western border as against what he wanted to do on his eastern border. On the western border he joined the global war against terrorism. The forces which had organized terrorism in Afghanistan had actually been sponsored and promoted by the Afghan bureau of the ISI. He distanced himself when put under international pressure but for some reasonable period of time had a completely contrary stand when it came to the western borders. "Fighting Jehad against India is a duty of the entire Muslim world. Kashmir cannot be resolved by a means other than Jehad" - This is Osama Bin Laden on August 27th. Masoor Azhar one of the terrorists who got released after the hijack - "Our mission is just not Srinagar, we have to capture New Delhi". And the tactics which are deployed -- when I mentioned the deployment of tactics like attacking social cohesion in Indian society -- you have the head of the Deendar-e-
Anjuman chief -- this is the organization which was banned after several churches in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh were attacked --. "The Mujahideen will fight, you must cause loss to the government property and divert its attention when I enter India through Kashmir with 8 lakh people, money should be looted for financing the activities". And the next sentence is very significant in the context of what this organisation Deendar-e-Anjuman had done. "Attack Christians so that international pressure will be built on government and on India".

This is really the magnitude of the threat that we face today. How do we try and answer this threat? The threat, this can really surface by various methodologies which are reached. There is a lot of ideological inspiration which goes in, there is a lot of training which goes in. The kind of training, which almost inspires you and motivates you to die yourself. In fact, the suicide squads which have created an impact in several parts of the world, United States, India being some of their prime targets, are organized by people who are actually not scared to die and therefore, with their ability to hit out at a target which is not prepared for such an assault, the danger level seems to be very high.

What then is the real answer to this? The answers are several. For one, you need a very powerful, not only domestic but with international co-operation a very strong link, a grid, virtually a national and international grid, as far as the intelligence systems on these people are concerned. You need to have knowledge of their activities in advance because terrorists always choose the time and place of their assault. They never give you a warning in advance and therefore targets are taken by surprise. You need a genuine and a powerful international cooperation as far as terrorists are concerned. You need a powerful security regime as far as terrorists are concerned and finally you need a very strong and
powerful legal regime. How to deal with them once you are able to get hold of them. As far as the international regime is concerned, over the last few years it has slowly been building up. After 9/11 hopes have really been raised that the international regime against terrorism is actually going to be very powerful and strong. In fact, I do recollect, this is what the Home Minister had mentioned yesterday in Parliament, that there was one impression of the World during the cold war regime. There were identified groups, identified poles in the World with which smaller nations had their own friendships and therefore their stands were well known in advance. But once the World moved towards more being a uni-polar world, coupled with the new terrorist threat, the World has started actually having a newer methodology of looking at all this. And particularly in this context, when we meet our friends from the United States of America, one of the surprises which we always express to them, or the concerns which we express to them, that today the regime for having two different standards on dealing with terrorist organizations or on dealing with democracies world over is entirely different. And, therefore, whenever an effort is made to give at least some more time, if not benefit of the doubt, to those nations which are responsible for sponsoring terrorism in this region and trying to destabilize the region it becomes quite un-understandable, particularly after 9/11. Our war or battle against terrorism did not begin on 9/11. We been fighting our lone war for almost 10 to 15 years prior to that. 9/11 only enabled the World to wake up to the reality of the consequences of terrorism. And the World having woken up to that reality when 3,000 people unfortunately lost their lives in New York, labeled it as a war which is launched on the United States of America; then with more than 70,000 people having suffered the same fate, terrorism on our soil cannot be taken to be any ordinary war and therefore, the world leaders of the global alliance need not at this stage merely advise restraint. They equally
have a responsibility to be on the forefront of fighting this terrorism because their war against terrorism is not selective, it is global.

There are several positives, if I may mention. The several positives which have taken place in the last few years, particularly through the decade of the 90s when this whole war started. In Punjab we were able to overcome. In one or two regions of North-East, we been able to overcome. In fact, one of the States there is now getting a peace bonus. As far as Kashmir is concerned, there seems to be a significant improvement as far as the intelligence systems are concerned. The international opinion on Kashmir also has undergone a sea change in the last decade or so. On various international forums Pakistan had successfully attempted to internationalize the issue of Kashmir and take it beyond the realm of a bilateral discussion or a bilateral solution. Today, particularly in the post Kargil era, more so on the post 9/11 era, events after 13th December attack on Parliament, two major attacks on Jammu, have also demonstrated that today the World focus in the context of Kashmir has more been on internationalization of cross border terrorism. India’s efforts to internationalize Pakistan as a sponsorer of that terrorism seem to have succeeded more than Pakistan’s attempts to internationalize the Kashmir issue which it traditionally has been trying for over the last 50 years. There is also a considerable amount of pressure on Pakistan if not in actuality at least ostensibly to try and alter its position. It has on several occasions, its new head of state, has been mentioning how the country is trying to keep terrorist organizations at bay, trying to suppress some of them or ban some of them; also indicating that at times they themselves are victims of these organizations. But these statements seem to be highly doubtful, particularly in the context of every attack in India seems to have originated from Pakistan; the attackers seem to be people belonging to that state, in fact several intercepts, messages and other hard evidence
seems to be indicating that, it's that country which is really acting as a base for giving refuge to all these organizations. One aspect is of at least ostensibly changing your position. But words are no substitute for action. What really is required to be done is that the various formats of infrastructure for terrorism which exists requires to be dismantled and dismantling that infrastructure for terrorism, is perhaps the most important responsibility as far as Pakistan is concerned. There is infrastructure availability in terms of centrality of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism, sabotage and subversion, there is infrastructure in terms of terrorist training camps; there is infrastructure in terms of providing the entire logistical support; there is infrastructure in providing hardware, there is infrastructure in providing money, there is infrastructure in even providing at times regulars from the security forces for this activity. And then pretending ignorance of these people originating from Pakistan. The real test of Pakistan being not sponsoring terrorism or not being a supporter of cross border terrorism or not allowing infiltration to continue, has to be as to how quickly it can really dismantle this entire infrastructure for sponsoring terrorism which exists in that State. There are other positives also, in fact the security forces, the army, the other paramilitary forces, in the last several months or years, if I would say so, are increasingly getting an upper hand against the terrorists. We normally find figures, if we read between the lines, how many security people lose their lives for every one terrorist that they kill. In days of high terrorist activity the figure was almost one against one. Today there is a very wide difference. Today the security forces have been able to actually overreach a large number of them except in cases where they are able to take targets by surprise and that is the real challenge which we face -- as to how do we protect the soft targets whenever these soft targets are made targets of terrorist attack itself. One of the important areas as far as terrorism is concerned is also having a strong legal regime in dealing with terrorism. And strong legal regimes World over have
provided enough ground to several organizations to actually start complaining that the legal regime is bit too tight. Britain over the last two years has formulated such a regime, the United States has its laws, which are far tougher than ours and there are several components of this legal regime which are required. The first being, you must have a clear cut definition of what is terrorism and a very harsh punishment for terrorism. You make funding terrorism an offense. Funds are to be confiscated. In fact, when funds used to be passed on to organizations earlier it could well have been offences under much lighter laws such as FERA or now FEMA. But once it becomes funding of terrorism and gets identified as a terrorist act itself, this becomes a major deterrent action as far as terrorism is concerned. And that is why one of the major demands that countries, which are victims of terrorism, made to several other nations from where the funding comes was to block sources of funding. The next ingredient of a strong anti-terrorist legal regime has to be that profits of terrorism which then provide an infrastructure to terrorism itself, should be confiscated. It is a rule of law in any civilized society that no person can be allowed to retain to himself profits of crime. In fact 30 years ago we legislated a law where profits of smuggling under SAFEMA (Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators [forfeiture of property] Act,) are to be confiscated. No man can enrich his pockets by profits of crime. Gun running, drugs, narcotics, arms, if you deal in these areas and earn profits, no civilized society can allow you to enrich yourself. And, therefore, one important component of anti-terrorist legal regime has to be that whatever is earned through loot or blackmail, whatever properties it is converted into, whatever bank accounts or liquid cash which is converted into, the same doesn’t belong to the person who converts and the same is liable to be confiscated. Banning terrorist organizations and making membership or activity of terrorist organization subsequent to the ban to be an offense -- the ban has several consequences. Why were we expecting the United States to
ban *Hizbul Mujahideen* or *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, why were they the first to ban *Al-Qaeda*. When we ban organizations in one part of the World consequences flow out of that. And therefore one civilized nation expects another as part of the global alliance to start banning terrorist organizations. Two of the most important instruments in law which have been used against terrorists and hardened criminals world over have been the use of modern technology. Terrorists no longer operate in the forests. They are no longer desperados who live away from mankind. They may be living in your buildings, apartments next to your house. And one of the methodologies by which police has been able to track down hardened criminals is the use of modern technology, i.e. intercepts. In the good old regime till the 1970s and the 80s when anybody thought of giving police the power to intercept communications, a liberal society always stood up and said "well big brother, watching this is not conducive to a liberal society". What does an investigator do, what does an anti-insurgent police force do, particularly when terrorists never announce their targets of their attack. It is a part of their usual intelligence gathering that you must be informed in advance as to how and what their next target and next planned activities are going to be. In fact in most of the cases where the Bombay Police under the Maharashtra law has been able to achieve some success is through the intercepts which are made. And intercepts World over -- the British Law now allows it, the American Law allows it -- intercepts have been -- in fact the Maharashtra Law was the first Indian Law which allowed intercepts to a police -- have become important instruments, in not only intelligence gathering but also in securing conviction. Ordinary denials will have to be proved in a normal court of law, because the policeman is at odds to prove various facts and the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt and many others. But when faced with his own voice not many are able to deny, what their real intent was. Therefore, lawful intercepts by the police, but these lawful intercepts should not be misused. Therefore, there has to be a safeguard regime in
terms of having who you intercept, being approved in a post-decisional hearing by a specialized review committee. There are also special rules of evidence, special rules of trials which are required. The United States has gone to the extent of having secret military tribunals and one of the reasons they have secret military tribunals is that there are large number of ordinary citizens who in open trials are not prepared to come and depose against these hardened criminals. The kind of protection to be given to the witnesses, the more difficult bail provisions -- these are all important legal instruments of a powerful regime which is an anti-terrorist regime. We must in this context analyze the issue with a little greater depth than some of the surface reactions as to the changes which we make to the law. I will give three examples, two recent and one a well known illustration. The Parliament was attacked on the 13th of December. The five gentlemen of the terrorists who attacked the Parliament were killed on the spot. In every suicide action to get the Fidaheen alive is very difficult. They either kill the security people and escape or get killed themselves. And therefore to find out any better evidence from them is normally very difficult. All five died on the spot. How does an investigator move under the normal law. Under the normal law the investigator has to find out who were the people behind these five. Who were the people who gave them the entire logistical support who were part of conspiracy to blast India’s Parliament. The five are dead. One clue leads you to the first person and it leads you to second person, third person and then somebody breaks down and says well we were all brought into the picture and money was given to us by some gentlemen hiding in the hills at Pahalgam called Gazi Baba and the other man says he provided us with money which came from across the border, we went several times across the border and had training. They were members of a banned organization. The most important pieces of evidence are not going to be ordinary eye witnesses who were present in the Parliament somebody like me. Because, eye evidence can only be against
those five who are no more alive. But to get behind who is behind these five you have to crack up one of those five. And that leads from one to another. And therefore the traditional rule of confessional statements not being admissible is one procedural aspect which had to be changed. It has been changed in anti-terrorist laws in various parts of the world. But for that component how are you able to then establish the whole chain. A recent major case came in, when one of the leaders of a separatist organization in Kashmir was arrested for having received huge funding. How does the investigators get the first clue about funding The clue was intercepts. Intercepts between international funding groups -- and whenever you go to foreign countries and ask for repatriation or extradition of those people who have been funding these, you require evidence. In the modern technology but for the intercepts being permissible, but for confessional statements with safeguard being made be admissible, to go behind these conspiracies is going to be very difficult. In fact the most significant case -- and that was a case when TADA was still in force. The campaign against TADA had started because of its misuse after the Bombay blast cases. But when the late Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991, TADA was still in force. The people who killed Mr. Rajiv Gandhi died on the spot. When the special investigating team went behind and started investigating all those who were a part of the conspiracy all that they could find in terms of evidence besides little circumstantial evidence, who gave the money, who gave the weapons, who gave the inspirations, who provided them shelter, who provided them with vehicles, were their own statements. And finally when the Court was dealing with the case, I re-read and re-read the judgment of the Supreme Court in the assassination case of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. TADA had a similar provision, a much tougher provision for recording confessional statement and admitting them. The difference between TADA and POTA was that in TADA it could be recorded before a senior police officer and that was enough, in POTA it is to be recorded before a
police officer and within 24 hours ratified before a Judge. So there is a safeguard. You have to first do it here and then go before a Judge. You take those 4 or 5 statements which these people had made against themselves out. There was no other legally admissible evidence. So we would actually have had a situation where a former Prime Minister gets assassinated before a crowd of several thousand people, the assailants die on spot and the entire conspirators, but for the fact that a special rule of evidence did exist, there was no other way where evidence against them would have been forthcoming. Therefore, one of the very important aspects of a fight against terrorism has to be the establishment of a strong anti-terrorist legal regime. When you establish strong regimes, as I said in the very beginning, whether it is a security regime, or it is a legal regime even if you try and put in the best kind of safeguards, human rights groups world over complain that the possibility of some form of aberrations or violations of human rights may take place.

And therefore even when this regime is being implemented, a democratic society can never lose sight of the fact that to fight terrorism you don’t have to get into an exercise where police has the power to actually go and haul up the innocent and there being no remedy as far as law is concerned. To that extent the concern has to be appreciated. There are a large number of human right groups, citizen groups, political groups, state human rights mechanisms which therefore in this situation have a very important role to play. As responsible organizations they have to watch out that no innocent really should become a victim of a tough regime but that is as far as human rights groups genuinely concerned with human rights are concerned. There is a second category of human rights groups also which has emerged. And the second category of humans rights groups, I regret to say, have been the over-ground face of the underground -- every underground insurgent movement carries with it an over ground human rights organization. These are to be seen
in contra-distinction with some of those, the statutory ones and the other genuine ones and one of the objects of these organizations is to be to actually continuously carry on a campaign which indirectly goes to the benefit of terrorists. So every time the Peoples War Group in Andhra Pradesh attacks an industrial establishment you will find the same old faces coming up and saying it is the repressive machinery of the state we are fighting. They are always silent about what the Peoples War Group has done to the people of Andhra Pradesh or to the economy of the State or the industrial establishment or the individuals it is trying to target. You will find similar campaigns carried on in relation to several other areas where terrorist attacks take place. And, therefore, as a matured democracy, a responsible society, we must be very careful of this second category of human rights organizations which now experience has taught us have actually become an over-ground supporter of what is otherwise a banned or an insurgent or a terrorist activity itself. Well these are all challenges which a matured society has to face. Terrorism's capacity to destroy life, to destroy economy, to destroy sovereignty of countries, is tremendous. Its ability to devalue democratic tradition is to tremendous. Foreign insurgencies also gain support when they are given refuge from segments of the domestic society and therefore the maturity of the Indian society is always on trial when the country is trying to fight these agencies. It is a war which India cannot afford to lose, it is a war which has to be fought through the mechanism of intelligence, with the mechanism of removing some of the social discontent which in some areas does cause terrorism. These are several aspects to it but as I said today, it is perhaps one of the greatest challenges as far as Indian society is concerned. Thank you very much for having invited me to deliver this address. I must mention that I did not have the privilege of personally knowing the Late Mr. Lalit Doshi but from what I read about him and from the kind of response his friends and admirers all seem to have given to him, some of whom are present today, I can
only say in civil service it is very difficult to leave after leaving strong footprints behind but he seems to be one of those who certainly has left them behind.

Thank you very much